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Reproducing Difference—Race and Heredity from a longue durée Perspective 
The classification of mankind into three or four major “races”—“white,” “black,” and 
“yellow” or “red”—is still very much alive, even in the high-tech contexts of today’s 
genomics and systems biology.i For example, the International Haplotype Map Project 
initially studied human genomic variation based on four “population samples.” The choice of 
these samples is revealing: for its pilot study, the HapMap project looked at “samples from 
Nigeria (Yoruba), Japan, China and the U.S. (residents with ancestry from Northern and 
Western Europe [...]).”ii This choice was no doubt guided by the long-established 
classification of humans into four big “races” according to skin color, as it was originally 
proposed by Carl Linnaeus (1707-1778) in his Systema naturae of 1735.iii The HapMap 
Project thus exhibits a curious mixture of archaic concepts and the latest tools of molecular 
biology. 
 Examples like this indicate a recent resurgence of racial categories in genomics which 
many observers have found surprising and unsettling.iv After all, it was preceded by a broad 
consensus—both among practitioners and commentators, and dating back to the so-called 
“UNESCO Statement on Race” from 1951—that the concept of race belongs to the past and 
has been thoroughly outdated by the combined efforts of mathematical population genetics 
and molecular biology. However, in the wake of the completion of the Human Genome 
Project and with projects like the Human Diversity Project, the HapMap Project, various 
national “biobank” projects, and a diversity of private and public initiatives, racial categories 
appear to have regained significance in recent years, inside and outside the biomedical 
sciences.v Racial distinctions are used as “proxies” in projects that try to map health 
disparities onto patterns of genomic variation; drug and life-style recommendations target 
racially defined groups, and genetic tests purport to determine ancestry in racial terms. 
Increasingly, close historical scrutiny also reveals that, throughout the post-WWII era, race 
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was not only occasionally put back on the agenda through high-profile publications such as 
Richard J. Herrnstein’s and Charles Murray’s The Bell Curve (1994), but actually persisted as 
a distinct, though little-publicized thread in medical and population genetics research, 
especially in epidemiological contexts.vi 
 What is it, then, about concepts of race—introduced in a patently ad hoc fashion by 
Linnaeus, and again and again denounced as primitive and untenable by prominent life-
scientists in the course of their long history—that lets them persist, despite the rapid, 
conceptual and technological advances that biology has seen, especially in the twentieth 
century? In the following, I will try to give an answer to this question based on results from a 
long-term project on the history of the concept of heredity.vii In a nutshell, my answer will 
amount to the following: the concept of heredity, when it entered biology in the early 
nineteenth century, did not refer to the fixity of species or the age-old observation that “like 
engenders like.” It was geared rather towards a much more specific phenomenon—namely, 
that of “heritable variation.” From very early on, as I will explain in the first two sections of 
this paper, hereditary diseases on the one hand, and racial characteristics on the other, formed 
the paragon of hereditary phenomena. This is of great significance for the history of the 
human sciences, including anthropology and medicine. First of all, the juxtaposition of 
pathological and racial characters led to a conflation of the normal and pathological, or the 
natural and the accidental. Moreover, it was only through the focus on the resulting, 
somewhat oxymoronic causal constellation—consisting in the production of an original, 
individual “deviation,” whose effects were then “regularly” reproduced in offspring—that a 
space opened for a truly historical outlook in the life sciences, as epitomized in Charles 
Darwin’s theory of evolution.viii Heredity does not follow the logic of natural kinds, but that 
of historical events with lasting effects. In conclusion, I will come back to my original 
question, making the point that concepts of human race persist to this day because they have 
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been indelibly inscribed in the conceptual architecture that has supported, and continuous to 
support, all attempts at describing and controlling human variation on a global scale since the 
early modern period. 
 
1. Heredity and disease 
“Heredity” originally only had a legal meaning in all European languages and was derived 
from the Latin “hereditas,” meaning inheritance or succession according to rules specified by 
law.ix It was only around 1800 that heredity began to be used as a metaphor to address 
phenomena of organic reproduction. In the German-speaking world, Immanuel Kant (1724-
1804) seems to have been the first to do so in his anthropological writings in the 1770s and 
1780s, to which I will return below. The Oxford English Dictionary lists Herbert Spencer’s 
Principles of Biology from 1863 and Francis Galton’s Hereditary Genius from 1869 as the 
earliest references for “heredity” in the modern, biological sense. Carlos López Beltrán has 
studied in detail, how French physicians—psychiatrists or so-called “alienists” in particular— 
by the late eighteenth century started to discuss heredity and later dissminated the 
“philosophical and physiological” use of the term throughout Europe. López Beltrán also 
points to a peculiar linguistic shift that accompanied the spread of this parlance—namely, a 
shift from an adjectival (héréditaire) to a nominal use (hérédité), indicating the reification of 
the concept, or in López Beltrán’s words, the establishment of a “structured set of meanings 
that outlined and unified an emerging biological conceptual space.”x 
 That physicians played a crucial role in the initial shaping of the discourse of heredity 
is no coincidence. In fact, the dating of the emergence of this discourse around 1800 must 
admit one notable, but rather narrowly circumscribed exception within medicine. Since the 
late medieval period, physicians had sporadically referred to diseases that were restricted to 
particular families as “hereditary diseases.” Admittedly, as Maaike van der Lugt has 
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emphasized, such diseases played a very minor role in scholastic medicine. The dominating 
doctrine of disease was that of humoral pathology, which defined diseases as disturbances in 
the balance of the four body humors: blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile.xi The 
constitution of a particular person was believed to result from the specific proportion of these 
four humors and according to the preponderance of this or that humor distinguished between 
sanguine, phlegmatic, choleric or melancholic temperaments. What we would call 
“environmental factors” today, by contrast, were summarized as the six “non-naturals”: light 
and air, nutrition, movement, sleep, excretions, and emotions. These were considered non-
natural since they could be influenced by the physician or patient, for example, by keeping to 
a certain diet, or through blood-letting. In general, therefore, diseases were identified with the 
states of individual bodies that were elicited by a variety of incidentally or periodically 
recurring factors, rather than as entities that could be abstracted from their manifestations in 
individual bodies.xii 
 Thus, within the humoral framework there was little room for a conception of 
diseases, let alone bodily properties in general, that in any literal sense could be seen as being 
passed down or transmitted from parent to offspring. When metaphors of inheritance were 
used in the late medieval and early modern period with reference to  diseases that were 
observed in certain families only, it was therefore not so much the inheritance of mobile and 
alienable properties—money for example—that people had in mind, but rather the passing on 
of landed property. Thus Jean Fernel (1497?–1558) maintained in his Medicina (1554) that a 
son is “as well inheritor of his [father’s] infirmities as of his lands.”xiii The problem was not to 
explain how properties were transmitted, but rather to explain how the causal agents that once 
had been involved in the generation of ancestors could remain active in the generation of their 
remote descendents.xiv This is how William Harvey (1578-1657) was to formulate this 
problem more generally in his Exercises on the Generation of Animals of 1651: “The knot 
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therefore remains untied [. . .], namely: how the semen of . . .  the cock forms a pullet from an 
egg . . ., especially when it is neither present in, nor in contact with, nor added to the egg.”xv 
 It is precisely this conundrum—a variation on the problem of action at a distance—
which also preoccupied those few physicians who in the late medieval and early modern 
period specifically devoted themselves to hereditary diseases. The first to do so was Dino del 
Garbo (c. 1280-1327), who taught medicine according to Avicenna’s Canon medicinae in 
nothern Italian universities in the early fourteenth century. Two manuscripts from around 
1320 survive which contain disputations that deal with the question “whether a disease which 
is in the father can become hereditary in the son (utrum aliquis morbus qui esset in patri 
posset hereditarius in filio).”xvi Avicenna had already distinguished hereditary from 
contagious and regional diseases at the beginning of the Canon medicinae, but without any 
further comment.xvii Starting from an analysis of the juridical concept of heredity, Dino 
proceeded to distinguish between truly hereditary (morbi ex hereditate) and connate diseases 
(morbi ex generatione). Connate diseases resulted from events that caused a change in the 
seed or embryo during conception or pregnancy. Dino argued that hereditary diseases, by 
contrast, had to be present already in the father to warrant the analogy with the transmission 
of worldly goods. A similar distinction was made slightly later in medical manuscripts by 
John of Gaddesden (c. 1280-1361), court physician of Edward II in England.xviii 
 Dino del Garbo’s careful distinction remained largely ineffective, however, even if the 
phrase “hereditary disease” from then on appeared occasionally in European medical 
literature. Many authors applied the term to diseases which, according to Dino, should have 
been considered connate, such as leprosy, which many believed to arise from intercourse 
during menstruation. Humoral pathology continued to dominate medical thinking, and Dino 
had indeed indicated that hereditary diseases were in need of a different explanatory 
framework. Referring back to Aristotle’s theory of generation, he maintained that hereditary 
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diseases could only be explained by a permanent change in the “formative power” (virtus 
formativa) of the male seed.xix 
 It took almost three centuries for the next attempt at a systematic account of hereditary 
diseases to appear on the scene. In 1605, Luis de Mercado (1532-1611)—professor of 
medicine at Vallodolid and court physician of Philipp II of Spain—published De morbis 
hereditariis.xx With Dino del Garbo, Mercado assumed that it was a permanent change in the 
vis formativa of the seed which caused hereditary diseases. Unlike Dino, however, he 
followed Galen in assuming that both the male and the female produce seed which mix in 
generating the embryo. Hereditary diseases consisted for him in a changed “character 
(character)” of the body, which he described as “preternatural (praeter naturam),” as it 
differed in some respect from the ordinary. To account for such changes, Mercado supposed 
an interesting metaphor. Since they had to be due to changes in the “virtue of the seed (vi 
seminis) of the parents, grandparent or great-grandparents,” it seemed as if “nature regulated 
the generation of individuals by some instrument (instrumento) in such a way that they 
produce individuals deformed by a similar defect (eadem labe foedatos).”xxi The expression 
“character” is borrowed from the Greek and does indeed refer to instruments used for 
brandishing domestic animals (and slaves!) or stamping money. Alongside this, Mercado also 
frequently used the term sigillatio, derived from sigillum, Latin for seal, which in theology 
denoted the indelible, but invisible nature of the sacraments.xxii 
This model of inheritance allowed Mercado to distinguish hereditary diseases sharply 
from connate ones, and it should be integrated with solidist conceptions of disease in the late 
eighteenth century, which explained disease by a permanent lesion in the structure of the 
body.xxiii Yet even if Mercado thus sometimes spoke of hereditary diseases as “untreatable,” 
he saw some room for therapy. On the one hand, symptoms could be suppressed by adequate 
diet or treatment, and over the course of several generations such a treatment would also 
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change the hereditary character. On the other hand, it was possible to compensate for a 
diseased character by combining it with a healthy one in generation. In this way, Mercado 
also explained the curious fact that hereditary diseases sometimes jumped one or several 
generations. Hereditary diseases could remain latent.xxiv 
 Dino del Garbo’s and Louis Mercado’s discussions of hereditary diseases demonstrate 
that heredity first emerged as a subject at the periphery of medical discourse. Today it seems 
evident that every disease has a genetic component. For physicians and natural philosophers 
in the late medieval and early modern period, however, hereditary diseases were one special 
form of disease alongside others. The hereditary transmission of diseases appeared as a 
curiosity. Thus, Michel Montaigne (1533-1592) asked himself when he began to suffer from 
gall stones at 45 years of age, just like his father had at the same age, what kind of “prodigy 
(monstre)” was hidden in the male seed so that it not only transmitted “impressions” of the 
bodily conformation, but also of the “thoughts and inclinations of our fathers.”xxv After all, 
Montaigne also shared with his father a pronounced antipathy towards physicians. For 
Montaigne, heredity was not a generalizable, natural phenomenon but an example of the 
“miracles in obscurity” with which nature confronts humans on a daily basis. What was so 
intriguing about the gallstones was that they appeared at the same age in both father and son 
even though the elder had not yet developed this ailment when he generated his offspring. All 
other examples that Montaigne listed to illustrate heredity share the eccentric character of 
curiosities. Members of the Roman family Lepidus were often born with one eye covered by 
cartilage; according to ancient tradition, a Thebian tribe was distinguished by a lance-like 
birthmark; and, if one believes Aristotle, some of the Greek tribes practicing “women . . . in 
common” determined paternity by means of such bodily oddities.xxvi 
 Heredity was thus not seen as instantiating a natural law, but quite on the contrary, it 
belonged to the realm of individual peculiarities and accidental aberrations. “All things are 
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governed by law” is the conventional translation for the opening sentence of the Hippocratic 
tract De genitura (“On Seed”).xxvii Yet, it is worthwhile to consult its Renaissance Latin 
translation: “Law strengthens everything (Lex quidem omnia corroborat),” where “law 
(νόµος),” as the translator Girolamo Mercuriale (1530-1606) carefully noted in a comment, 
means “customs, pasture, region, tribe (instituta, pascua, regionem, classem).”xxviii Law, in De 
genitura, did not refer to universal laws of nature, but to the persistence of local tradition and 
circumstance. The foundation for similarities between parents and offspring was thus 
provided by the fact that, as a rule, similar conditions prevail during procreation and 
development. Conversely, this meant that any deviation from the ordinary course of things 
would produce deviant results. The reproduction of similarity was thus as trivial as it was 
precarious, always remaining vulnerable to disturbances and transgressions. 
 
2. Heredity and human variety 
That inheritance was largely seen as something restricted to special circumstances in the early 
modern period can be seen from the fact that Carl Linnaeus (1707-1778), who was one of the 
first to propose a universal classification of mankind according to skin color, still felt 
compelled to underline that skin color should be seen on par with other variable 
characteristics, like stature or body weight, that clearly depended environmental factors such 
as nutrition.xxix It was only in the course of the eighteenth century, and especially towards its 
end, that the peculiar behavior of heritable characteristics—the fact that they were transmitted 
without being influenced by external conditions—began to be seen as an instantiation of 
something akin to natural laws. Kant played an important role in advancing this perspective, 
and it is to his writings on race that I now want to turn. 
 For Kant, no variation in bodily characteristic was not enough to constitute a racial 
difference. To the contrary, the differentiation of humanity into a set of interrelated races 
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constituted for him a narrowly circumscribed, highly specific phenomenon. He clearly 
distinguished racial characteristics from species-specific traits on the one hand, which did not 
differ at all throughout a species and thus seemed to obey some constant law, and variable 
traits on the other hand, which either differed in accordance with changing environmental 
conditions or did not obey any obvious rule at all in their appearance among offspring. Only 
racial traits, according to Kant’s definition, were traits that were invariably transmitted to 
offspring even under changed environmental conditions, and yet would regularly and 
predictably blend in hybrid offspring. European parents, to use Kant’s favorite example, 
would continue to produce white children even when living in Africa, and Africans would 
continue to produce black children even when living in Europe, while both together produced 
children of an intermediate, brown skin color, again, regardless of the particular environment 
in which they were born.xxx Such a phenomenon, as Robert Bernasconi emphasizes in his 
contribution to this volume as well, undercut the distinction of specific forms and accidental 
peculiarities. In characterizing classes at a sub-specific level, racial characteristics belonged to 
the individual peculiarities that interfered with the universality of species. Yet, these 
peculiarities were being reproduced infallibly, generation by generation, and thus seemed to 
be subject to the same kind of laws that governed the reproduction of species.  
 To account for this, Kant brought together natural law and contingent family history in 
his concept of Vererbung. The dispositions, or Anlagen, for hereditary traits were included 
from the very beginning in the organization of the original stock of ancestors from which all 
of humanity sprang, and were in this sense preformed and not acquired in a reaction to 
particular circumstances. Once these dispositions had been expressed as actual traits in 
reaction to a particular climate, however, they would be permanently and irrevocably 
transmitted.xxxi Again, this behavior might seem to be nothing but a curiosity. But as Raphael 
Lagier has argued, the explanation of this behavior occupied a central place in Kant’s overall 
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philosophical project. It was able to resolve the major conundrum, clearly realized by Kant, 
that the supposedly universal moral and epistemological values that underwrote the 
Enlightenment were of a distinct geographic origin; in short, the Enlightenment was a 
distinctively “European” achievement, at least in the eyes of Europeans.  
 Kant explained this conundrum by maintaining that the equipment of the original 
human stock with Anlagen for adaptations to various climates, such as skin color, served the 
purpose of a universal geographic distribution of humankind. This “natural” distribution was 
over-run by a further process—the spread of civilization—which Kant saw as uncoupled from 
the former. The partition of the human species into four races, caused by their adaptation to 
distinct climates, was for him thus nothing but an accidental feature in relation to the 
universal spread of civilization—itself a destiny of the human species in as much as it 
amounted to the full realization of man’s rational faculties.xxxii Despite being accidental with 
respect to the destiny of mankind, the partition provided Kant with a rationalization, if not 
justification, of why certain races would either be overrun by civilization or reduced only to 
play a certain role in it. Depending on their presumed propensity towards work and 
reproduction, again a product of climate and soil, Americans were bound to go extinct, 
Africans to become enslaved, and Asians to be left behind by the process of civilization. 
Civilization and progress were entirely European affairs; neither essentially, nor necessarily, 
but by an accident of natural history that happened to place Europe and its (white) inhabitants 
at the center of the “centrifugal space of human identity,” as Lagier puts it.xxxiii Racial 
hierarchies, in other words, were not simply a product of nature, but of the natural history of 
mankind, involving migrations and adaptations to particular climates.xxxiv 
 What were the sources of Kant’s curious concept of race? The concept of human races 
was not a simple invention of eighteenth century naturalists like Linnaeus, Georges Louis 
Marie Leclerc, Comte de Buffon (1707-1788), or Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752-1840), 
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who were the authors on whom Kant relied for his account. These naturalists, in their turn, 
relied on travelers’ accounts, which reported a curious system of social stratification, which 
had been instituted in the Spanish and Portuguese overseas colonies: the so-called castas. This 
classification scheme originated from attempts to find a measure by which legal and social 
status could be allocated to the various sections of colonial society. It seemed to be primarily 
based on a classification of people according to skin color and, to a lesser degree, also on hair 
form and eye color. And children resulting from mixed marriages seemed to be positioned in 
this scheme by analogy to the simple mechanism of color mixing, implying processes of 
transmission and “blending” that connected traits of parents with traits of their offspring. 
During the eighteenth century, the system of castas found expression in a rich, pictorial genre 
in Latin America with pictures devised as sets arranged in serial or tabular form. Each of the 
individual pictures shows a mixed couple and its child, and each bears an inscription that 
states the components entering the mixture, that is, each parent’s casta, and the result of the 
child’s casta.xxxv 
 Despite its rigid appearance, the castas system remained in constant flux throughout 
the early modern period, as witnessed by a rich proliferation of castas terms. In fact, it was 
not despite, but just because it was so rigidly based on an abstract classification according to 
color and on inheritance as an equally abstract mechanism, that the castas scheme could cope 
with this proliferation. The distinction according to colors—white, black, and brown—
analytically defined the positions for all sorts of intermediate and more complicated cases. 
And the transmission and blending mechanism offered a unified explanation for their coming 
about, in so far as it could be regarded as operating independently of particular circumstances. 
To determine the casta of a person, it therefore sufficed to know the castas of his or her 
parents. Due to its analytic and quasi-mechanical character, the castas system could absorb a 
wealth of new phenomena while remaining stable in its basic outlines. It could therefore also 
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account for the more capricious phenomena of heredity, like “regressions” or “throw-backs,” 
as exemplified by a special caste in the system, the torna atras issuing from a Spaniard and an 
albina, that is, a white, blonde, and blue-eyed woman, which among its great-great-
grandmothers had one black woman. Their child was usually depicted with a very dark skin 
color. The system of castas, as Renato Mazzolini put it, constituted “a vast field of ‘pre-
Mendelian’ investigation.”xxxvi 
 It was not intended to do so, of course. In its original, local context of colonial 
America, clothes and occupations played as much an important role in the assignment of 
casta as the possession of particular physical characteristics.xxxvii As Renato mazzolini argues 
in this volume, it was the European commentator who paid particular attention to physical 
characteristics such as skin color. Once abstract, but purportedly universal classifications had 
been established on this basis, however, a curious process of accretion set in that brought 
other properties, including medical, cultural and political ones, back into their fold. This is 
particularly evident in Linnaeus’s successive presentations of human diversity. In the tenth 
edition of his Systema naturae, published in 1758, he did not only note skin color and other 
physical traits for each of his four races, but also medical temperament (i.e., Americans turn 
out to be “choleric,” Europeans “sanguine,” Asians “melancholic,” and Africans 
“phlegmatic”), moral characteristics, preferred clothing, and form of government.xxxviii 
 
3. Heredity and the struggle for life 
The accretion of facts of widely different kind under the same classification of human races 
that I described at the end of the previous section is of great significance, as it resulted in a 
conflation of the normal and pthaological in hereditarian thinking. While a “sanguine” 
temperament—and hence a disposition towards the development of certain diseases according 
to medical doctrines of the time—is declared normal for Europeans, it would be abnormal for 
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them to be phlegmatic, which again is normal for Africans, or so Linnaeus maintains. “Blue 
eyes (oculis caeruleis),” on the other hand, suddenly stick out as a rather odd peculiarity of 
Europeans in Linnaeus’s racial scheme.xxxix This tendency towards a conflation of the normal 
and the pathological became a conspicuous element, often highlighted explicitly, of 
eighteenth century theories of heredity. Thus Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis (1698-
1759) wrote in his Venus physique of 1745 on the occasion of numerous observations of 
albinos or “white negroes (Negres-blancs)”: “Whether one takes this whiteness as a disease, 
or due to some accidental cause, it would always be a hereditary variety, which establishes 
itself or is effaced in the course of generations.”xl 
 Such conflations of the natural and the pathological in late eighteenth-century 
accounts of human variation infused a lasting element of historicity into subsequent attempts 
to write the natural history of mankind. In a similar manner as Kant, Maupertuis believed that 
nature contained the sources of human variations, but that it was “chance or art (le hazard ou 
l’art)” that shaped these into distinct races analogous to breeders who “each year create some 
new species, and destroy those which are out of fashion.”xli “If the [white] Negroe, who is 
presently in Paris,” he therefore mused about his chosen subject, “found a Negresse here who 
is as white as he is, he would perhaps have only black children with her, because the number 
of generations may not have been enough to erase the color of their first ancestors. But if one 
engaged for several generations in giving white-negroe women to the descendants of this 
Negroe . . . such alliances would strengthen the race.”xlii The albino was a rare deviation, 
something earlier generations of naturalists would have addressed as “preternatural” or 
“monstruous.” Yet suitable measures, according to Maupertuis, could establish albinism as 
the new norm.xliii 
 This recourse to analogies with breeding technologies, such as selection and 
inbreeding, to explain patterns of physical distinctness has a long legacy as well, taking us 
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back once more to the late medieval period, but again in a very narrowly circumscribed 
context. While Dino del Garbo wrote his disputations on hereditary diseases, European 
universities also witnessed a revival of ancient conceptions of “noble blood” in the context of 
polemical disputes about the nature and status of nobility. At the University of Paris, for 
example, a number of satirical disputations asked jokingly, if nobleman were characterized by 
long ears, just like certain dog races. This echoed the language of contemporary literature on 
the breeding of falcons, dogs and horses, which frequently employed notions of “nobility,” 
and also is one of the earliest sources of concepts of race.xliv It was again around 1800, that a 
more somber note was added to this discourse when historians began to connect it with 
notions of “struggle” and “war.” As Michel Foucault emphasized, a number of historians 
began to describe the English Civil War and the French Revolution as instances of a perennial 
struggle of distinct human races.xlv Thus the French historian Augustin Thierry retraced the 
origins of the French Revolution to the conquest of Gallic territories and their population by 
Germanic tribes.xlvi In a letter to Friedrich Engels, Karl Marx revealingly called Thierry “le 
père [the father] of class struggle.”xlvii  
 This is not the place to retrace these complex developments. I would like, however, to 
highlight two things: first, quite in line with the original, juridical meaning of heredity, racial 
characters were seen as the product of a (political) will that contained an element of caprice. 
The breeder “corrects forms and varies colors, thus producing the Harlequin, the Mopse, etc.,” 
Maupertuis mused, and asked himself, why the “sultans,” who keep “women of all known 
species” in their “serails” do not likewise resolve themselves “to make new species.”xlviii This 
implies, secondly, that racial diversity and destiny were not so much understood as the 
outcome of a necessary, natural law, but rather as the outcome of a historical process 
involving ever shifting constellations of diverse motivations and forces. 
 These two motives came to the fore with utmost clarity in Charles Darwin’s theory of 
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evolution. One of the statements most often repeated in his Origin of Species (1859) is that 
there is no “fixed law of development.”xlix What Darwin aimed at with this statement was to 
deny that there were laws governing the development of species. There was neither a law 
guaranteeing the fixity of species, as Carl Linnaeus had believed a century earlier, nor a law 
constituting progress towards forms of ever higher complexity, as in the theories of species 
transformation put forward by Jean-Baptiste Lamarck or Darwin’s grandfather Erasmus. Yet 
one of the main principles of Charles Darwin’s theory, the “principle of divergence of 
character,” relied on the regular occurrence of heritable variations. So if there was no general 
law of development, there were at least laws—or “tendencies,” as Darwin preferred to call 
theml—that governed the reproduction of individuals. Inheritance, in particular, was defined 
by Darwin in a crucially peculiar way. Relying on “Dr. Prosper Lucas’ treatise, in two large 
volumes”, as well as the experiences of breeders, Darwin defended inheritance against 
“doubts thrown on this principle by theoretical writers” in the following way: 
 
When a deviation appears not unfrequently, and we see it in the father and child, we 
cannot tell whether it may not be due to the same original cause acting on both; but 
when amongst individuals, apparently exposed to the same conditions, any very rare 
deviation … appears in the parent … and it reappears in the child, the mere doctrine of 
chances almost compels us to attribute its reappearance to inheritance.li 
 
Inheritance, as is evident from this passage, was for Darwin not a process that simply 
accounted for similarities between parent and offspring. Such similarities could easily be, and 
had indeed been for a long time, explained by assuming that similar causes remained active in 
generation. Much more specifically, inheritance comprised cases in which a difference or 
deviation occurred, which was then reproduced despite the fact that both varieties lived under 
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essentially the same conditions. “The saying that ‘like begets like’,” as Darwin stated in 
Variation of Plants and Animals under Domestication (1868), “has, in fact, arisen from the 
perfect confidence felt by breeders, that a superior or inferior animal will generally reproduce 
its kind.”lii 
 It is important to notice that inheritance thus defined, as well as its counterpart, 
variation, turn out to be capricious, not necessarily adaptive “tendencies.” “Inheritance 
operates fitfully”, as Robert Bernasconi perceptively observes in this volume, Variation leads 
to differences reproduced under essentially the same environmental conditions, and by 
inheritance, identities are retained even if conditions change. In both cases, the results may, 
but are certainly not necessarily, perfect adaptation. The two sources that Darwin drew upon, 
Prosper Lucas’ (1805-1885) Traité philosophique et physiologique de l'hérédité naturelle 
(1847), which epitomizes a long medical tradition of dealing with hereditary diseases, and 
breeders’ knowledge about the production of distinct and constant races, make this point 
abundantly clear. In both cases, inherited differences are conceived of as individual deviations 
from a norm, in the former case non-adaptive and in the latter case adaptive, if only measured 
against the strict selection regime imposed by the breeder. At the very heart of living nature, 
and not only in its more exceptional productions, such as albinos, Darwin diagnoses 
capricious forces at work. Hereditary variation is clearly at odds, both with a view that sees 
organisms as always already adapted to their environments and a view that regards organisms 
as having limitless plasticity in their interaction with the environment. “Divergence of 
character,” therefore, brought about by the combined effects of variation, inheritance and 
natural selection, can, but must not necessarily happen. It depends entirely on the degree to 
which a new variety is indeed better adapted to the prevailing conditions of life. “We must not 
… assume that divergence of character is a necessary contingency,” as Darwin put it, “it 
depends solely on the descendants from a species being thus enabled to seize on many and 
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different places in the economy of nature.”liii  
 With this perspective, nothing can be taken for granted in the long run. It is true that 
most nineteenth-century theories of heredity were directed towards the economically, socially, 
and politically disadvantaged, and thus exhibit what Carlos López Beltrán has termed the 
“hereditary bias” of dominant elites.liv This bias should not be mistaken, however, as a sign 
for steadfast belief in a static, natural hierarchy of “primitive” and “advanced” forms of life. 
Characteristically, the ancient idea of a scale of beings saw different stages of perfection as 
necessary ingredients of nature. The modern idea of an evolutionary scale, by contrast, views 
the less perfect or “primitive” manifestations of nature as something that could, and usually 
would, eventually be overcome. By the same token, however, success was not guaranteed. 
Ideologies of progress were therefore invariably coupled with deep-rooted fears of 
degeneration and calls for technologies of elimination and purification that could counteract 
the spontaneity of nature.lv 
 
4. Conclusion 
As is well-known, Darwin’s theory of natural selection was met with indifference, if not 
hostility, in the medical community if we leave aside the important exception of eugenics. 
Cell biologists like Rudolf Virchow, physiologists like Claude Bernard, bacteriologists like 
Louis Pasteur, all remained skeptical about it if they commented on evolution at all. This 
skepticism, however, should be seen as specifically directed against the principle of natural 
selection. Another centerpiece of Darwin’s theorizing, the principle of inheritance—that 
which starts out as a rare deviation may come to constitute a new norm—did have a huge 
impact on biomedical thinking. It opened prospects for both the production of specific 
differences through targeted intervention and the reliable reproduction of such differences in 
the form of “purified” populations of controlled inheritance. Specific forms ceased to be 
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eternal and immutable, and entered the realm of what could be created and manipulated. In 
other words, the recognition of heredity as a central life force opened the road for the entry of 
targeted, experimental interventions and well-defined model organisms in the life sciences.lvi  
 With respect to humans, experimental intervention and genetic manipulation will 
always remain problematic, if not anathema. The use of human subjects for experimental 
purposes is fraught with moral and political problems. I believe this is precisely why we see 
biologically crude, but historically, socially, and politically, highly significant racial 
categories constantly re-appear in bio-medical research. Albeit ad hoc and “artificial,” they 
provide the conceptual grid of last resort to gauge patterns and capacities for hereditary 
variation in humans, as the organizers of the HapMap project readily concede.lvii  In a sense, 
as physical anthropologists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have insisted upon again 
and again, it is the history of mankind, with its alliances, migrations, revolutions, and 
conquests which provides the human sciences with its one and only experiment.lviii This also 
means that a dismissal of the concept of human races as “essentialist” or “typological” will 
usually miss the point.lix The science of heredity, and with it the concept of human races, has 
not left us more subjected to nature. On the contrary, it has turned our very nature into 
something that is historical through and through, and hence lies open to future projections. 
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